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Lending A Helping Hand?: A Guide to
Kentucky's New Predatory Lending Law
BY KENT H. BARNETT*
INTRODUCTION
P redatory lending practices have plagued the poor since Biblical
times, through the Renaissance to the modem day.' Although
governments have long outlawed or limited usurious lending, the
American legislatures of the twentieth century have been trapped
between two factions: the booming voices of lenders crying out for
freedom of contract, and the stifled voices of the working class and the
poor, whose mistreatment at the hands of unscrupulous lenders usually
comes to the attention of legislators only through the megaphone of
advocacy groups. Addressing predatory lending practices has become
2
more urgent as an increasing number of Americans buy homes.
Predatory lenders increased in size and number during the late 1980s
and 1990s, encouraged in part by the 1986 changes to the federal tax
code that favored second mortgages and credit spending.3 Moreover,
* B.A., summa cum laude, 2002, Centre College; J.D. expected 2005, University of
Kentucky. The author sincerely thanks Katherine Yunker and Katherine Sanford for their
helpful comments regarding this note.
1 As he sought to rebuild the Jewish wall, Nehemiah found that the rich were
exploiting the poor. He admonished them for charging interest on debts and for
mortgaging and foreclosing on the homes and fields of other Jews. Nehemiah 5:5-12.
Other condemnations of usury exist. See, e.g., Matthew 18:21-35 (Jesus preaching that
masters should be merciful with their debtors). Such passages led the Catholic Church to
condemn the charging of interest for money and fueled Europeans' longstanding
suspicion of money lenders. See The Christian Church and its Promotion of Anti-
Semitism (2005), at http://www.languedoc-france.info/a-jews.htm (noting that, although
Deuteronomy 23:20 allowed Jews to lend money with interest to gentiles and these
interest rates were a fraction of those that modem bankers impose, Christians accused
Jews of usury).
2 Arthur B. Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in US. Family Finances: Results from
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 17-18 (2000) (noting that
American homeownership rose between 1989 and 1998 to a high of 66.2% in 1998).
3 ELIZABETH RENAURT & CAROLYN L. CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
TRUTH IN LENDING 200-01 (Supp. 2002). For readers who desire an introduction to
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mainstream lending institutions abandoned poorer areas during the same
period, creating a void that predatory lenders quickly filled. These
4predatory lenders became the community's only financial resource.
With these lenders cornering the market, subprime home equity loans5
nearly doubled, swelling "from $274 billion in 1994 to $470 billion in
1998. "6 While these subprime loans could have resulted in a boon to
low-income communities, they were not always benign. Instead, they
were often predatory loans-subprime loans with additional unfavorable
terms not found in prime-rate mortgages.
Even as legislatures encourage subprime lending because it allows
people with lower incomes and troubled credit histories to obtain loans,
they seek to prevent predatory lending, which unfairly harms these same
people. 8 In 1993, Congress held hearings on lending practices 9 and found
that "[a]busive practices continue to exist in some segments of the home
equity lending market, demonstrating the need for additional
protections.... [I]mproved disclosures [required for most home loans
under the Truth in Lending Act] may not aid comparison shopping
significantly in underserved markets where there is less competition."1 °
federal legislation concerning predatory lending, Truth in Lending provides a
comprehensive (and comprehensible) overview for advocates. The 2002 supplement
details all of the latest changes to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
("HOEPA"), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994).
4 Id. at 201.
5 Subprime home equity loans have interest rates above market rates. See Joseph A.
Smith, Jr., North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law: Its Adoption and Implementation,
presented at the National Conference of State Legislators Annual Meeting (July 26,
2002).
6id.
7 See id. (defining subprime loans).
8 Id. Although Smith, the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks, argued that banks
must address predatory lending practices themselves, he stressed the difference between
subprime and predatory lending. While subprime loans charge more interest than the
market rate, the additional interest is necessary to compensate the lender for the
additional risk. Predatory lenders not only charge high interest rates, they also include
unfair terms that overcompensate the lender and make the loan disadvantageous to the
borrower. See id.
9 See generally Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending
Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter
Problems in Community Development Banking]; The Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1993, Hearing on S.294 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993). To motivate Congress to pass protective
legislation, supporters from across the country traveled to the hearings by bus and sang
spirituals and civil rights standards. RENuART & CARTER, supra note 3, at 202.
1o Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. and the Dept of Housing and Urban
Dev., Joint Rep. to the Cong. Concerning Reform to the Truth in Lending Act and the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 51 (1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.
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To remedy problematic lending practices, in 1994 Congress passed
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA")" as an
addendum to the Truth in Lending Act ("TLA").12  TILA requires
disclosure of loan information so that borrowers can easily comparison
shop among lenders. Congress, however, found that these disclosures
were insufficient to prevent predatory lending problems and passed
HOEPA to address these insufficiencies. 3 Unfortunately, HOEPA did
not eradicate predatory lending. In fact, "[t]he subprime . .. mortgage
lending industry [grew] significantly . . ., expanding from a $35 billion
industry in 1994 into a $140 billion industry in 2000."'14 In response,
Congress amended HOEPA in 2001, requiring additional disclosures,
placing certain substantive limits on home equity loans, and casting its
net over additional types of loans.'
5
Prior to 1994, federal laws preempted state usury ceilings and
regulations regarding balloon payments, 6 negative amortization, 7 and
prepayment penalties.' 8 States naturally had become less involved in
regulating lending markets. With the passage of HOEPA in 1994,
Congress repealed its proscription of state-law regulation by explaining
that HOEPA should be interpreted "to allow states to enact more
protective provisions than those in this legislation."' 9 State legislatures
began attacking predatory lending during the late 1990s, passing more
specific laws with harsher penalties than those under HOEPA.
In 2000, North Carolina became the first state to enact a predatory
lending law.20 The North Carolina law requires, among other things, that
lenders consider borrowers' ability to pay and that borrowers undergo
gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf.
11 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2191 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994)).
12 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2005).
13 See generally ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING (4th ed. 1999) (providing a thorough overview of TILA
and the role of HOEPA in Congress' consumer protection statutory scheme).
14 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT intro. (AARP Pub. Policy Inst. 2001), available at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/predatory-mortgage/content/home-loan-protecti
on.pdf.
15 See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2005); ELIZABETH RENUART, NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 43
(2002) (noting the Federal Reserve Board's revision to Regulation Z in December 2001).
16 "Balloon payments are large payments which come due during a loan term,
usually at the end of the term. They pose a problem for consumers because they rarely
have the means to pay the full amount." RENAURT, supra note 15, at 38 n.82.
17 "Negative amortization occurs when the payments due each period are insufficient
to cover the interest on the loan as it comes due." Id. at 39 n.83.
" Id. at 20.
19 H.R. CO N. REP. No. 103-652, at 162 (1994).
20 RENUART, supra note 15, at 49 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (1999)).
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credit counseling with a certified credit counselor.2' North Carolina's
Commissioner of Banks, Joseph Smith, said that states were compelled
to legislate because federal legislation was insufficient to remedy
predatory lending. Two years after passage of the new state law, Smith
said that the law seemed to have had very little effect on credit
availability in the state.23 North Carolina's experience, which showed
that protective legislation did not hinder the ability of poorer citizens to
obtain loans, prompted several other states to follow its lead. Among the
states that have recently enacted. predatory lending laws or ordinances are
California,24  the District of Columbia,
25  Georgia,26  Illinois, 27
Massachusetts,28 New York,2 9 Pennsylvania,30 and Texas. 31 By 2003,
New Mexico 32 and Arkansas 33 had also joined this group. 34 Moreover,
the AARP (formerly known as the American Association of Retired
Persons) promulgated the Model Home Loan Protection Act in 2001.
The Model Act extracts the best parts of various states' legislation and
36provides valuable commentary concerning its provisions.
During the 2003 legislative session, the Kentucky General Assembly
addressed predatory lending by proposing House Bill 240.3' The bill
called for high-cost home loans to have a reasonable benefit to the
21 See id. at 50.
22 See Smith, supra note 5.
23 See id. at 4.
24 CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4979.8 (West 2002).
25 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1151.01 to -1155.01 (2001).
26 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (2004).
27 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, §§ 1050.100-2195 (2004).
28 MASS. GEN. ANN. ch. 183, §§ 1-18 (West 2004).
29 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-1 (McKinney 2003).
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 456.101-.3 101 (West 2004).
3 1 RENUART, supra note 15, at 50. Not all of these states have followed North
Carolina by passing specific legislation against predatory lending. For instance,
Massachusetts adopted TILA so that victims of predatory lending have a cause of action
under state law. But Massachusetts went further, applying its new law not only to closed-
end transactions, (those where one borrows a set amount, such as with a traditional bank
loan) but also to open-end transactions (those where one can borrow up to a certain limit,
such as with a credit card). Texas, instead of passing legislation, amended its constitution.
See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50(a)(6) (preventing foreclosure on homesteads with
mortgages whose principal, when added to all other preexisting liens on the home,
exceeds 80% of the fair market value of the home, and also protecting homeowners from
several other predatory practices).
32 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-21A-1 to -14 (Michie 2004).
33 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-53-101 to -106 (Michie 2003).
34 Anti-Predatory Lending Laws Around the Country, at http://www.acorn.org/
index.phpid=736 (last visited October 15, 2004).
3 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14.
36 See id.
37 H.B. 240, Gen. Assem., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2003).
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borrower and to be closed only at the "office of the lender, loan broker,
attorney, title insurance company, or similar place of business. ''38 It also
excluded mandatory arbitration clauses (and any other type of clause that
would foreclose borrowers from pursuing class-action remedies) and
held assignees liable for any statutory violations.39 Most importantly, it
demanded that the borrower undergo credit counseling, a requirement
that was prominent in North Carolina's legislation. a Unfortunately,
however, this aggressive bill failed to make it out of the House Banking
and Insurance Committee.4 ' Some representatives, such as Rep. Robert
Damron, an investment banker, opposed it as "overly broad[,]" destined
to "[shut] people out of homeownership. 'A Opponents not only attacked
the counseling requirement based on the lack of credit counselors in the
state, but they also condemned the provision providing assignee liability
because they feared that the promissory notes would not be as valuable
on investment markets.4 3
In place of House Bill 240, the legislature unanimously passed
House Bill 287, now codified as K.R.S. § 360.100.44 While not as
protective as House Bill 240, this legislation still requires substantial
disclosures and places substantive limits on high-cost home loans. a5
The purpose of this note is to furnish the consumer advocate with an
in-depth analysis of Kentucky's new predatory lending law by
examining the basic structure of the statute, and its ambiguities, faults,
and remedies. Practitioners will understand the impact the law may have
on high-cost home loans, the potential traps that await their clients, and
the provisions that require amending. Part I discusses the applicability of
the statute.46 Part II focuses on Kentucky's limitations that dovetail
HOEPA requirements for high-cost home loans.47 Part III discusses
provisions of the Kentucky law that require much more than, or in some
cases something slightly different than, the federal legislation a.4 Part IV
considers causes of action and potential remedies.49
38 id.
39 Id.
40id.
41 Id. The world-wide-web version of House Bill 240 provides the latest progression
of each bill considered by the Kentucky General Assembly. House Bill 240 was posted
to committee on February 5, 2003, and the committee apparently took no further action.
42 Deborah Yetter, Proposed (Ky.) Bill Would Reel in Predatory-Lending [sic],
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Feb. 5, 2003, at F1.
43 Id.
4Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 360. 100 (Michie 2003).
45 See id.46 See infra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 68 128 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 129-178 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 179-208 and accompanying text.
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After parsing the statute and reading this note, advocates will
understand the issues and arguments that are likely to arise and that the
effect of K.R.S. § 360.100 will largely depend upon the construction
given to it by the courts. Ultimately, K.R.S. § 360.100 could become a
powerful weapon against predatory lending if consumer advocates,
during the developmental phase of the statute, argue for liberal judicial
interpretation and petition the legislature for amendments that will better
effectuate the purpose of the legislation.
1. APPLICABILITY OF K.R.S. § 360.100
Before investigating the applicability of K.R.S. § 360.100, advocates
for both sides must determine whether the legislation should be narrowly
or liberally construed. Unlike the Model Home Loan Protection Act,
which states that it "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
purpose[,]" 5 ° the Kentucky law fails to mention the method of
construction the courts should adopt. Until the courts make such a
determination, lenders will likely argue that it should be strictly
construed because the more liberal House Bill 240 failed and because the
legislature did not expressly instruct the courts to interpret it liberally.
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, may counter that the Act should
be liberally construed in the same manner as the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act ("KCPA"),5" which is referenced in K.R.S. § 360.100,
because both seek to protect consumers from dishonest business
practices. The courts should accept the consumer advocates' position
because, without liberal interpretation, lenders may be able to fulfill the
letter of the law while ignoring its reformatory purpose. In fact, if the
courts fail to read the statute broadly, they will overlook both the purpose
of the statute and its actual wording. By punishing any "subterfuge" that
would make a mockery of the predatory lending statute, the legislature
has considered and condemned the possibility of literal compliance that
fails to comply with its purpose. 52
To qualify for the protections of K.R.S. § 360.100, the loan at issue
must be a "high-cost home loan. 53 Such a loan is created when 1) "[t]he
principal amount of the loan is greater than .. .$15,000 and does not
exceed .. .$200,000"; 2) "[tjhe borrower is a natural person"; 3) "[t]he
debt is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes"; 4) the security interest is in the borrower's
principal dwelling place; and 5) the mortgage is a "mortgage" as defined
50 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § I(c).
51 See K.R.S. § 367.110-.370.
52 See § 360.100(3).
51 § 360.100(2).
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by HOEPA.5 4 A "mortgage" under HOEPA must 1) be a consumer credit
transaction, 2) have a security in the borrower's principal dwelling place,
and 3) have either more than 8% points of yield on comparable Treasury
securities on the fifteenth day of the month immediately preceding the
month in which the application is received by the creditor or total fees
and points that exceed the greater of 8% of the total loan amount or
$400."5 In 2001, Congress decreased the percentage requirements from
10% to 8% for first-lien mortgages (the first lien on the home mortgage);
subsequent-lien mortgages still do not fall under HOEPA unless the rate
is 10% greater than Treasury yields.5 6
Under HOEPA, the term "mortgage" specifically excludes those
mortgages qualifying as "residential mortgage transaction[s] ' '57 and thus
covers only subsequent mortgages on consumer property. K.R.S.
§ 360.100, however, includes "residential mortgages" in its definition of
"high-cost home loan''58 and applies, therefore, to both initial and
subsequent mortgages. This seemingly small alteration greatly expands
the reach of the Kentucky statute and demonstrates the legislature's
willingness to protect low-income borrowers from the problems faced
throughout the home-buying process.
After determining that a high-cost home loan exists, one must next
ascertain whether the lending party qualifies as a "lender" under the
statute. The definition of "lender" under K.R.S. § 360.100 is extremely
inclusive, referring to "any person who funds or negotiates the terms of a
high-cost home loan or acts as a mortgage broker or lender, finance
company, or retail installment seller with respect to a high-cost home
loan., 59 Thus, almost any original lender will be subject to K.R.S.
§ 360.100. But since mortgages are frequently assigned and traded as
54 § 360.100(1)(a)(1)-(5).
51 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2005). Congress gave the Federal Reserve Board
the authority to clarify the requirements and applicability of TILA (including HOEPA).
In response, the Board promulgated Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2005). In Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme Court instructed the
lower courts to defer completely to the Board and its regulations, unless the regulations
were "demonstrably irrational." Id. at 565.
56 Truth in Lending Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 and 65,606 (Dec. 20, 2001) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The Board lowered these rates because it had evidence that lenders
would pursue predatory practices with loans just under the HOEPA limits. There was
nothing to suggest that the reduction would have an impact on the ability of those with
tarnished credit ratings to receive credit. See id. at 65,607.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2004). "Residential mortgage transaction" is defined
as an initial mortgage on residential property. See id. § 1602(w).
8 See K.R.S. § 360.100(l)(a).
§ 360.100(l)(b).
2004-20051
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commodities, 60 it is noteworthy that Kentucky's law applies to assignees
only when an error "is apparent on the face of the disclosure or the
underlying promissory note.",61 Although Kentucky's law greatly reduces
assignee liability and therefore reduces the pressure on original lenders to
ensure that their mortgages comply with K.R.S. § 360.100, assignees still
have significant liability under HOEPA.62
HOEPA applies to creditors who provide more than one "mortgage"
in a twelve-month period or, alternatively, one "mortgage" with a
mortgage broker.63 While a lender who makes only one high-cost home
loan a year without a mortgage broker can evade HOEPA, the lender
cannot escape K.R.S. § 360.100. Nevertheless, Kentucky's law may not
capture all lenders. Since K.R.S. § 360.100(1)(b) explicitly defines who
is a lender at length, it is possible that, if a certain creditor does not fit the
statute's definition, courts could conclude that the lender at issue does
not fall under the statute. In the majority of instances, this definition will
be sufficient to cover most lenders of high-cost home loans because
"commercial banks are the primary source of home equity loans,
although the other types of depositories as well as finance companies
have significant market shares." 64
Finally, one must determine whether the Kentucky statute can confer
jurisdiction over a particular case. K.R.S. § 360.100, with its far-
reaching "long-arm" statute, should easily provide jurisdiction in most
cases. The provision extends to any offer made or accepted in Kentucky
60 See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change
in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 1003 (1986) (finding that 65% to 70% of
all mortgages are sold in the secondary market).
61 Id. The limited nature of assignees' liability in Kentucky has not gone unnoticed
by the market. See Standard & Poor's, Predatory-Lending Provisions of Kentucky Law
Reviewed (June 20, 2003), at www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp-re-ky287(2).pdf
(determining that, even though punitive damages for assignee liability may be uncapped,
assignee liability is limited enough that original lenders need only demonstrate that
compliance procedures can identify any high-cost home loans that must conform to
K.R.S. § 360.100).
6 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1):
Any person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a mortgage referred to in
section 1602(aa) of this title shall be subject to all claims and defenses with
respect to that mortgage that the consumer could assert against the creditor of
the mortgage, unless the purchaser or assignee demonstrates, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable person exercising ordinary
due diligence, could not determine, based on the documentation required by
this subchapter, the itemization of the amount financed, and other disclosure of
disbursements that the mortgage was a mortgage referred to in section 1602(aa)
of this title.
Id.
63 § 1602(f).
64 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 241, 243 (1998).
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involving a Kentucky resident with respect to real property within
Kentucky, regardless of the situs of the contract or the location of the
lender.65 If the parties so elect, jurisdiction may even apply to offers
66made or accepted in Kentucky by non-Kentucky residents. With such a
broad jurisdictional reach, out-of-state lenders would be subject to the
statute when making any "solicitation or communication to lend
originating outside of Kentucky" that is forwarded to a Kentucky
resident or when accepting any solicitation to borrow which originated in
Kentucky.67 This long reach is wise because it captures offers made by
national mortgage companies, which have easier access to Kentucky
residents via the Internet and telemarketing.
II. LIMITATIONS ON HIGH-COST HOME LOANS THAT RELATE TO
HOEPA
To examine the myriad requirements of K.R.S. § 360.100, Part II
first discusses the requirements that relate to those of HOEPA, and Part
III examines those requirements that are unique to Kentucky's statute.
Each requirement that falls under these two subdivisions is then
discussed individually so that advocates may quickly locate information
relevant to their particular issue. While some of the K.R.S. § 360.100
requirements that overlap with HOEPA are superfluous, most are helpful
because they provide a state cause of action for certain predatory lending
practices. Providing a separate cause of action demonstrates that the
Kentucky General Assembly takes the predatory lending problem
seriously.
A. Disclosures
HOEPA requires only two short disclosures 68 in addition to the
standard annual percentage rate and monthly payment disclosures that
TILA mandates. 69 The lender must disclose the principal amount of the
65 See K.R.S. § 360.100(5).
66 id.
67 id.
68 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1). The required disclosures read as follows:
(A) "You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you
have received these disclosures or have signed a loan application."
(B) "If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your
home. You could lose your home, and any money you may have put in to it, if
you do not meet your obligations under the loan."
Id.
69 § 1639(a)(2).
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loan and whether the borrower purchased credit or debt cancellation
insurance for loans made on or after October 1, 2002.7o
Besides these simple HOEPA requirements, K.R.S. § 360.100 adds
four more lengthy, written disclosures regarding comparison shopping,
credit counseling, taxes, and payment of existing debt.71 Under the
Kentucky statute, the lender must use the form of notice provided in the
statute or one that is "substantially similar., 72 Lenders must make K.R.S.
§ 360.100 disclosures at the same time they provide HOEPA disclosures,
which the Federal Reserve Board currently requires three days before
consummation of the loan.73 The timing of the federal and state
disclosures is critical because the lender cannot correct a late disclosure
after consummation. This three-day period is meant to allow the
borrower to contemplate the seriousness and necessity of borrowing on
such terms.74
While Kentucky's additional disclosures are designed to provide the
borrower with valuable information, they are unlikely to do so. First, the
six disclosures required under K.R.S. § 360.100 are too verbose, taking
up over a half page of single-spaced type. 7 Like boilerplate language in
standardized contracts, the parties are likely to disregard the writing as
mere "legalese." Second, Kentucky's statutory notice is in all capital
letters, while HOEPA's is written in plain font.76 Capitalization of all the
words makes the notice harder to read. Because people recognize letter
groups when reading by abstracting the letters into differently sized
rectangles, squares, and circles, a text written in all capital letters, which
form rectangles all of the same size, prevents one from easily
deciphering word shapes.77 It is, therefore, likely that buyers will not
fully read these notices, instead passing over and disregarding the hard-
to-read typeface.
The legislature might have been more successful if the statute
required that the notice only be "conspicuous," in the same manner
70 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3), (5) (2005); see also RENAURT & CARTER, supra note 3,
at 220.
71 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(h).
72 Id.
73 12 C.F.R. § 226.31 (c). K.R.S. § 360. 100 requires that disclosures occur whenever
the Federal Reserve Board requires HOEPA disclosures to occur, not necessarily three
days before. K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(h). Other TILA disclosures need only be given "before
consummation" of the loan. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b).
74 RENUART & CARTER, supra note 3, at 218.
7' K.R.S. § 360. 100(h).
76 Compare id., with 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1) (2005).
77 PATRICK J. LYNCH & SARAH HORTON, WEB STYLE GUIDE 133 (2d ed. 2001),
available at www.webstyleguide.com/type/empahsis.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
Although this guide is intended for website design, its reasoning is equally compelling for
any typed print.
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required under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-316(2)78 or
HOEPA.79 Courts, such as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
in Hunt v. Perkins Machinery Co., have said that '[a] term .. . is
conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom
it is to operate ought to have noticed it. "'80 The court went on to say that
when a disclaimer is in larger font or contrasting color or type, it is more
likely to be conspicuous. 81
The Kentucky statute, moreover, does not require the borrower to
initial that he has read the notice.82 This omission makes it easier for
lenders to "hide" the notice in a shuffle of papers and lead the borrower
to believe that the notice is just a bunch of "legal stuff' that has no real
effect on the transaction. Cautious lenders would be well advised to have
borrowers initial next to the disclosures for additional proof that the
disclosures were in fact made and noticed by the borrower.
Unlike the North Carolina law and the Model Home Loan Protection
Act, Kentucky does not require credit counseling in its legislative
scheme. 83 Counseling is likely the most effective way to ensure that the
borrower understands the terms and impact of the loan and recognizes
the importance of the disclosures.84 Counselors can spot abusive
practices or terms before the loan is consummated, which would
ultimately prevent expensive litigation, and explain the disclosures'
relevance to the borrower. Having the counselor explain to the borrower
that the disclosures are required because past borrowers have not
appreciated the risk that the high-cost loans entail may better impose the
gravity of the transaction upon the current borrower.
B. Prepayment Penalties
Lenders assess prepayment penalties against the borrower if the
borrower pays off the loan before the time upon which the parties agreed
78 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2003).
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1).
80 Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 226 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1967) (quoting U.C.C.
§ 1-201(10) (2003)).
81 Id. The court also quoted part of U.C.C. section 1-201, which says that a term is
conspicuous if written in all capital letters. The court, however, was considering how
brief terms could catch a party's attention. It was not deciding how an entire page of
information should be conveyed to another party. With the disclosures required by
Kentucky's statute, other devices for making a term conspicuous are more appropriate
than the use of all capital letters.
82 See K.R.S. § 360.100(h).
83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c)(1) (2003); MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT,
supra note 14, § 4(h). See also supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.84 See MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 4 cmt. (h).
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85when they entered into the transaction. Such a fee may seem reasonable
at first blush because it binds the borrower to the contract into which he
or she has entered, but lenders possess the power to threaten borrowers
with prepayment penalties to ensure that borrowers do not refinance
under better terms with a different lender.86 Most prime-rate mortgage
lenders need not add .prepayment penalties because prime-rate
mortgages, dictated by market forces, have low interest rates.87 Because
these low rates are comparable to those of other lenders, there is little
risk that the consumer will quickly refinance, leaving the lender without
enough interest paid to cover its closing costs. In fact, only 2% of prime
mortgages include a prepayment penalty, while 70% of subprime
mortgages have prepayment penalties. 88 By charging prepayment
penalties, the original lending institution is guaranteed to receive the
money needed to pay the considerable fee of the mortgage broker who
secured the subprime loan. If these prepayment penalties were not
allowed, the main lender could not afford to make high-cost loans;
instead, it would be forced to make loans at rates closer to prime because
the borrower would more likely be able to refinance. 9
Kentucky has wisely taken advantage of a federal rule that allows the
state to restrict prepayment penalties. Prepayment fees are not allowed
under HOEPA, with one five-part exception:90 for a prepayment penalty
fee to be allowed, 1) the indebtedness of the consumer must account for
less than 50% of monthly gross income; 2) the lender must verify both
the borrower's income and expenses; 3) the mortgage cannot be a
refinancing with the creditor (or one of its affiliates) who gave the initial
mortgage; 4) the prepayment penalty may be imposed for only the first
five years after the loan's consummation; and 5) the penalty must be
legal "under other applicable law."91 This fifth requirement permits the
states to disallow prepayment penalties completely. In K.R.S. § 360.100,
the Kentucky legislature chose instead to limit the time frame of such
penalties.92
Kentucky's approach may be termed the "3-2-1 rule." Under this
approach, the lender can change penalties only during the first 36 months
after the closing of the high-cost home loan. During the first 12 months,
the penalty cannot exceed 3% of the amount prepaid. During the second
85 RENUART, supra note 15, at 45.
16 See id. at 27.
87 id.
88 Id.
89 See id.
'0 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2004).
91 § 1639(c)(2).
92 See K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(a) (Michie 2004).
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12 months of the 36-month period, the penalty cannot exceed 2% of the
amount prepaid. Finally, during the third 12 months of the 36-month
period, the penalty cannot exceed 1% of the amount prepaid.93 The
Kentucky statute also reiterates the federal condition that prepayment
penalties can be assessed only if the high-cost home loan at issue does
not refinance a previous high-cost home loan with the same lender.
94
The Kentucky provision is uncomplicated and shows lenders in
Kentucky how to meet the HOEPA exception for prepayment penalties.
The stepped percentages allow lenders to ensure that they can cover their
costs and potentially profit from the loan if the borrower pays early,
while still encouraging borrowers to prepay or refinance. Prepayment
allows low-income borrowers to escape disastrous loans if they have the
opportunity, possibly by refinancing, and thus terminate their cycle of
indebtedness.
C. Negative Amortization and Balloon Payments
Negative amortization is proscribed by HOEPA95 and K.R.S. § 360.
100.96 When a loan is negatively amortized, borrowers do not pay
enough each payment period to pay off the interest that accrued during
that period; therefore, their balance is always increasing. 97 From a policy
standpoint, prohibiting negative amortization with high-cost home loans
makes sense because many borrowers can barely afford their monthly
payment. If borrowers can barely afford their monthly payment, they are
unlikely to be able to pay an accumulated lump sum at the end of the
loan when the extra accrued interest becomes due. Moreover, subprime
loans, by their very nature, already charge high rates of interest. By
constantly increasing the balance of the loan, the lender is able to
increase its profit because the interest rate will be applied against an
increasingly larger balance. Under both applicable statutes, advocates for
both parties should make sure that the borrower receives an amortization
schedule so that all parties can be certain that the loan is not negatively
amortized.
Balloon payments are closely tied to negative amortization. This type
of payment is either a final payment that is much larger than preceding
payments or the only payment required under the terms of the loan
93 id.
94 § 360.1000).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 1639(f).
96 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(d).
97 See RENUART, supra note 15, at 39 n.83.
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(usually years after the consummation of the loan).98 HOEPA prohibits
any balloon payment with loans having less than a five-year term by
requiring that the payments "fully amortize the outstanding principal
balance." 99 Because HOEPA proscribes negative amortization, HOEPA
necessarily limits the balloon payment for loans with terms longer than
five years to the initial balance plus interest accumulated during the last
payment period of the loan; regularly scheduled payments must, at a
minimum, cover the interest assessed for each payment period.
K.R.S. § 360.100 prohibits any scheduled payment that is more than
twice as large as the average of earlier regularly scheduled payments.
00
Significantly, this limitation decreases the size of the largest possible
balloon payment that would have been allowed under HOEPA (because
paying the principal plus last interest payment is surely more than twice
the size of earlier payments). Most importantly, this limitation decreases
the likelihood of foreclosures. Balloon payments do not provide low-
income borrowers with better rates. They merely provide these borrowers
time to stay in their homes or the illusion of significantly less expensive
financing. Many lenders promise to refinance when the balloon payment
comes due, but instead they foreclose on the property when the borrower
is unable to make the payment. 10' Kentucky's law, which recognizes that
the social cost of foreclosure is much too high to justify the benefit to the
borrower of reduced payments or extra time in his or her home, prevents
lenders from using this potentially deceptive device.
D. Prohibition of Provisions that Increase Interest Rates Upon Default
In the past, upon default of a loan, some lenders have increased
interest rates to as high as 42%, practically guaranteeing foreclosure of
the property. 102 Both HOEPA and K.R.S. § 360.100 prohibit any loan
term that increases the interest rate upon default. 10 3 Kentucky also
requires that the lender provide notice of the default to the borrower,
which 1) must be provided in writing and mention impending foreclosure
or other legal action thirty days before initiation of any action and
2) must specify the amount owed "to cure the default and the date by
which the payment is due."' 4 Both of these state and federal prohibitions
9
' Id. at 45.
99 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e).
'00 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(c). The statute creates an exception for payment schedules
that adjust "to the seasonal or irregular income of the borrower." Id.
101 RENUART, supra note 15, at 38 n.82.
102 Problems in Community Development Banking, supra note 9, at 314 n.9.
103 These no-increase provisions can be found, respectively, at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d)
and K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(e).
'04 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(s).
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seek to prevent foreclosure. 10 5 Since the lender is legally prohibited from
increasing the interest rate upon default, the lender has more incentive to
help the borrower restructure the payment schedule. Kentucky's notice
requirements also increase communication between the parties and allow
borrowers to cure their default before the lender threatens legal action or
assesses exorbitantly high default rates.
E. Acceleration of Indebtedness
Most loans contain a term that accelerates the maturity of the loan
upon the borrower's default, sometimes rendering it due immediately.
HOEPA allows this type of measure. 0 6 K.R.S. § 360.100 generally
appears to disallow it, but there are major exceptions. 10 7 K.R.S.
§ 360.100 creates exceptions when "the loan has been accelerated by
default, pursuant to a due-on-sale provision, or pursuant to some other
provision of the loan documents unrelated to the payment schedule.'
10 8
These exceptions ultimately swallow the rule and render the Kentucky
law more permissive than HOEPA.
While it is unclear whether HOEPA allows the date of maturity to
accelerate because of a due-on-sale clause or other similar provision,
HOEPA appears to prohibit only acceleration of indebtedness related to
the payment schedule and increased interest rates upon default.'09 Yet,
because HOEPA does not explicitly deal with due-on-sale and other
provisions, K.R.S. § 360.100 prevents a state cause of action for this
federal ambiguity. Ironically, while K.R.S. § 360.100 on its face seems
to prohibit almost all acceleration, upon closer inspection it provides
exceptions that HOEPA fails to consider, thus allowing acceleration
when the federal law does not provide an explicit exception.
Although K.R.S. § 360.100 is more permissive, a due-on-sale
provision is reasonable because it prevents the lender from having to
worry whether the new owner will maintain the collateral while the
borrower pays the loan. What is troubling about this exception is that it
covers "some other provision[s]" not related to the payment schedule." 0
105 See generally RENUART, supra note 15, at 65 (noting that a "creditor's decision to
accelerate and foreclose on collateral ... has been held to be subject to the duty of good
faith and fair dealing").
106 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d).
107 See K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(b).
'08 Id. A due-on-sale provision allows the lender to accelerate the date of the loan's
maturity when the borrower sells the home upon which that the lender has a mortgage.
KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE
COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 206 (2d ed. 2000).
109 See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d).
..0 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(b).
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It is unclear how broad this language is (does it means other provisions
similar to due-on-sale and default provisions?) and under what other
circumstances the borrower can accelerate the loan. Despite the
prohibition in the first sentence against the lender's sole-discretion to
accelerate, can the buyer still accelerate the loan whenever it, in its sole
discretion, deems itself insecure? Whether the lender feels insecure may
have nothing to do with the payment schedule. Instead, it could depend
upon the state of the collateral, zoning changes, or other factors beyond
the borrower's control.
F. Prepayments
Both HOEPA"' 1 and K.R.S. § 360.100112 allow no more than two
consolidated prepayments paid in advance out of the borrower's loan
proceeds. This limitation is intended to stop unethical lenders from being
able to invest that money without crediting any interest to the consumer's
account. 113 If the lender fails to credit the borrower's account for the
prepayments, the prepayments can also disguise the true amount of
money financed and thus increase the amount of interest that the
borrower must pay on the loan."
14
G. Consideration of Borrowers' Ability to Pay
HOEPA requires lenders to evaluate whether the borrower has the
ability to repay the loan." 5 This requirement is met by reviewing a
signed financial statement, a credit report, and employment-income
records to verify that the consumer's monthly obligations do not exceed
50% of his or her monthly gross income. 1 6 This provision requires
lenders to look past the potential borrower's home equity and
demonstrate that the borrower can meet his payments. Lenders are liable,
however, only when they engage in a "pattern or practice of extending
credit" without evaluating the borrower's ability to pay. "' Therefore, in
the event of litigation, the plaintiff-borrower cannot rely merely on his
... 15 U.S.C. § 1639(g).
112 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(f).
113 RENUART & CARTER, supra note 3, at 228.
114 RENUART, supra note 15, at 46; see also RENUART & CARTER, supra note 3, at
228.
115 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h).
116 Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(7)(iii) (2005)
117 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h).
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own inability to pay; instead, to meet his burden of proving the existence
of a "pattern or practice,"'1 8 he must engage in costly and lengthy
discovery of the lender's business practices. How many other similarly
situated borrowers must the plaintiff find to establish a pattern? What
counts as "similarly situated?" While this involved discovery might seem
to affect only the plaintiff-borrowers, it also concerns the defendant-
lenders, which presumably would rather their lending practices not be
made public through discovery procedures.
K.R.S. § 360.100 attempts to ameliorate this discovery nightmare by
looking at individual loans, not "patterns and practices."' 19 Under
Kentucky's method, lenders are potentially liable for each individual
transaction. Because lenders must "reasonably believe[] ... that one...
or more of the borrowers, when considered individually or collectively,
will be able to make the scheduled payments[,]" lenders must be more
diligent in ascertaining whether borrowers can repay the loan. 2° The
Kentucky statute requires lenders to evaluate the following criteria:
1) "current and expected income"; 2) "current obligations"; 3) "current
employment status"; and 4) "other financial resources, other than the
borrower's equity in the dwelling which secures repayment of the
loan.'
12 1
While Kentucky's requirements demand a less involved discovery
process and appear to favor the plaintiff-borrower, the statute also
includes presumptions that favor lenders. If the borrower's obligations
are below 50% of his total gross income, the statute presumes (in favor
of the lender) that the borrower can meet his payment. If the borrower's
obligations exceed 50% of his total gross income there is no
presumption, implying that the borrower cannot meet his obligations.
122
Thus, since the plaintiff borrower already has the burden of proof and
since in neither instance can he receive a presumption in his favor, the
presumption, or lack thereof, always favors the defendant-lender. In the
end, this provision eases the burden of discovery but fails to hold lenders
sufficiently accountable for ensuring that potential borrowers can afford
the payments.
118 See RENUART & CARTER, supra note 3, at 231.
"9 See K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(i) (Michie 2004).120 id.
121 id.
122 Id. Interestingly, HOEPA makes the opposite presumption if the borrower's
obligations exceed 50% of his gross monthly income. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(7)(iii)
(2005). The plaintiff, thus, never really receives a benefit: HOEPA, which presumes the
plaintiff's inability to pay, requires that he or she show "a pattern or practice"; the
Kentucky statute, which does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate a "pattern or
practice," does not create a presumption regarding his or her inability to pay. K.R.S.
§ 360.100(2)(i).
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H. Home Improvement Contracts
Borrowers often take out high-cost home loans when they need to
make home improvements. HOEPA12 1 and K.R.S. § 360.100124 place
restrictions on payments made from the lender to the home-improvement
contractor, These restrictions require that payments must be made 1) to
the consumer, 2) jointly to the consumer and the contractor, or 3), at the
election of the borrower, to "a third-party escrow agent in accordance
with terms established in a written agreement signed by the borrower, the
lender, and the contractor."'125 The purpose of this provision is to
discourage lenders from paying contractors before the home
improvements are complete and to provide the borrower with more
control over his transactions with the contractor.12
6
Timing' differences exist between the escrow options under the
federal and Kentucky statutes. HOEPA requires that the written
instrument be signed "before the date of payment, 127 while K.R.S.
§360.100 requires that the writing be signed "prior to the
disbursement."'' 28 To illustrate the effect of these provisions: if the parties
first sign the writing on the date of payment and then the lender makes
the payment to the borrower ten minutes later, the lender violates
HOEPA (because the writing was signed on, not before, the date of
payment) but not K.R.S. § 360.100 (since the writing was indeed signed
before disbursement of the payment). Because HOEPA's requirement is
more specific, it is impossible to violate K.R.S. § 360.100 without also
violating HOEPA. Thus, the Kentucky provision is without teeth,
providing a state remedy only if there is a gross violation of federal law.
The statute should have followed HOEPA so that a state cause of action
would follow all federal violations. Moreover, by not requiring a day
between the signing of the writing and payment, Kentucky's statute
allows the existence of high-pressured, fast-paced situations where the
borrower can be cajoled into choosing the escrow option or accepting
disadvantageous escrow terms.
123 15 U.S.C. § 1639(i) (2004).
114 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)().'
125 15 U.S.C. § 1639(i); see § 360.100(2)(1).
126 See RENuART & CARTER, supra note 3, at 233.
127 15 U.S.C. § 1639(i) (emphasis added).
128 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(1) (emphasis added).
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III. LIMITATIONS ON HIGH-COST HOME LOANS
SPECIFIC TO K.R.S. § 360.100
Not all provisions of K.R.S. § 360.100 are derived from HOEPA.
Kentucky's statute includes additional substantive requirements for
high-cost home loans and seeks to prevent problems that HOEPA fails to
address. For both lenders and borrowers, the following provisions
specific to Kentucky will remain fraught with uncertainty until the courts
clarify the ambiguities and define the scope of these provisions. Without
the ability to rely on HOEPA as an interpretive starting point, the court
should interpret the provisions broadly and rely on the statutory scheme
to effectuate the legislature's intent.
A. Refinancing
While refinancing a loan can be advantageous when market interest
rates drop or when the borrower needs to make home improvements,
unscrupulous lenders have persuaded borrowers to refinance repeatedly,
a practice known as "flipping." Flipping occurs when the borrower, who
is assessed large fees, refinances a loan many times over a short period
without any real benefit.' 29 The net result is that the exorbitant fees strip
the mortgaged home of its equity. 130
To halt the practice of flipping, sections (j) and (k) of K.R.S.
§ 360.100 limit the amount of fees that a lender can charge when
refinancing. 131 The sections are extremely intricate and confusing, but
they can be better understood when separated into two categories:
1) when the lender provides both the existing high-cost home loan and
the high-cost refinancing and 2) when the lender provides only the high-
cost refinancing. Note that both the original loan and the refinancing
must qualify as "high-cost." Advocates should first determine whether
both the existing loan and the refinancing qualify as high-cost home
loans, and then whether one lender provided one or both loans.
When the lender provides both the existing high-cost home loan and
the high-cost refinancing, the statute places several limitations on the
terms of the refinancing. First, the lender may not include "any
prepayment fees or penalties."'' 32 But does "penalties" mean "prepayment
penalties" or "any penalty whatsoever?" Consumer advocates will argue
that the legislature meant to exclude both prepayment fees and various
other penalties when the borrower is refinancing a high-cost home loan
129 See MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 3 cmt. (b).
130 See id.
'' See K.R.S. § 360.100(j)-(k).
i § 360.1000)(1).
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with another high-cost home loan because both types of penalties will
certainly contain disadvantageous terms for the borrower. Lenders will
argue that "penalties" is merely an appositive of "fees" because
"penalties" is mentioned in the same phrase as "prepayment fees." The
lenders may have the stronger argument because certain penalties, such
as those associated with default, may be necessary for a lender to risk
refinancing under certain circumstances. The prohibition of prepayment
penalties actually encourages repayment, while a prohibition of all
penalties would deny the lender its usual mechanisms to ensure
repayment. Moreover, an absolute prohibition of fees would render later
references to maximum allowable fees for refinancing nugatory. 1
33
Next, the statute distinguishes between situations in which points or
fees were assessed under the -original high-cost home loan, and those in
which they were not. If points were charged under the original high-cost
home loan, no fees besides those allowed by Regulation Z134 may be
charged on the proceeds used to pay the existing high-cost home loan)
35
The lender can assess fees on any proceeds from the refinancing that
exceed the amount of the existing loan,136 but fees on the excess amount
cannot exceed 4% of the total amount financed. 137 If points were not
charged under the original high-cost home loan, the lender may charge
points and fees up to 4% of the amount refinanced, excluding those fees
allowed under Regulation Z. 1
38
Where the lender provides only the high-cost refinancing, it may
charge points and fees for any proceeds used to pay off the previous
high-cost home loan and for any fees allowed by Regulation Z, subject
to some limitations. 139  If points and fees were assessed against the
existing high-cost home loan, the lender may not charge any fees or
points on proceeds used to pay a high-cost home loan within one year of
the consummation of the high-cost refinancing. 40 There is no 4%
restriction on the fee charged on the total amount financed. Any fees on
133 See, e.g., §§ 360.100(k) (referring to points and fees for a refinancing of a high-
cost home loan) & 0)(2) (allowing points and fees that are not in excess of 4% of the
amount financed).
134 Regulation Z allows lenders to include fees for title examination, title insurance,
property surveys, preparation of loan documents, credit reports, notaries, appraisals,
certain escrow accounts, and determinations for pest infestation and flood hazard. 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7) (2005).
135 See K.R.S. § 360.100(k).
136 id.
1 37 Id. § 360.1000)(2).
138 See § 360.100(k).
139 id.
140 id.
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money in excess of the proceeds for the existing high-cost home loan
may be assessed at any time.
141
Ultimately, the refinancing requirements and prohibitions in K.R.S.
§ 360.100 are needlessly confusing. In fact, the Kentucky statute is so
complicated that a lender could easily violate it, even if acting in good
faith and with the aid of counsel. A much simpler option would be to
follow the AARP's Model Home Loan Protection Act, which states, "No
creditor making a high-cost home loan shall directly or indirectly finance
any points or fees.' ' 142 While lenders may argue that such a broad
prohibition may impede them from providing necessary refinancing,
these fears are unwarranted. North Carolina adopted this simple
language, 143 and its Commissioner of Banks stated that there has been
little effect on the availability of subprime lending in that state.
44
B. Modification Fees
K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(g) requires that, when modifying the terms of a
high-cost home loan or deferring payments, the lender can charge fees
only if 1) "the fees are less than one-half... of any fees that would be
charged for a refinance" or 2) "the borrower is in default and it is in the
borrower's best interest."'145 The legislature appears to have inserted this
provision to prevent lenders from classifying a refinancing as a
"modification"; any lender who does so will receive only one-half of the
allowable fees for a refinancing. Moreover, when a loan is simply
modified or extended rather than completely refinanced, the statute
places a limit on the amount of fees that the lender can charge for these
less involved services.146
To avoid any problems under this provision, lenders should simply
comply with the first option when modifying financing, ensuring that
whatever fee is charged is less than one-half of the fee that could be
charged for a refinancing. However, there may be situations where a
larger fee is warranted. For instance, when a borrower is in default, the
statute's scheme encourages lenders to seek payment from defaulting
borrowers, which may require larger fees, rather than accelerate the date
of payment and begin foreclosure proceedings. However, to charge
141 See id.
142 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 4(a).
143 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c)(3) (2003) for North Carolina's language,
which mirrors the Model Home Loan Protection Act.
144 Smith, supra note 5.
.45 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(g).
14 6 id.
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higher fees, the borrower [must be] in default, and it must be "in the
borrower's best interest.'
47
Ambiguity engulfs this statutory standard. For example, which word
or phrase is the antecedent of "it?" Does "it" refer to the fee, the
amended high-cost home loan, or the default? Only the amended high-
cost home loan makes any sense because a default or a fee charged for
modification rarely will be in any borrower's best interest. But there still
are problems with the "in-the-borrower's-best-interest" standard.
Specifically, it begs the question: who decides what is in the borrower's
best interest? What are the criteria for determining it? Is the
determination based on the borrower's long- or short-term interest?
Faced with such ambiguities, the courts will likely decide each case on
its facts; a case-specific approach gives the courts more room to declare
certain fees unreasonable and others appropriate. The problem with such
case-specific analysis is that lenders would have little notice of whether
a particular fee is "in the borrower's best interest."
To protect borrowers and give lenders some measure of certainty,
courts should adopt a reasonable-person standard to examine all factors
incident to the modification, especially the fairness of the terms of the
modified high-cost home loan and the entire financial condition of the
borrower at the time of the modification. Such a standard would bring
some (but, admittedly, not much) objectivity to an amorphous touchstone
until enough cases have been decided to delineate the contours of "best
interest."
C. Consolidation of Low-Interest Loans
K.R.S. § 360.100 says that "[a] lender shall not refinance, replace, or
consolidate a zero interest rate or low interest rate loan made by a
government or nonprofit lender with a high-cost home loan. 148 Some
unscrupulous lenders have convinced borrowers that they must include
these beneficial loans in the high-cost home loan to obtain it or that they
will benefit by consolidating it into the high-cost home loan. Few
borrowers understand that the fees and interest rate that apply to the rest
of the loan also apply to the no- or low-interest loan. For example, in
Georgetown, Kentucky, Sue Cook faced foreclosure after Household
International Corporation ("Household") consolidated her zero-interest
147 id.
148 § 360.100(2)(m). A low-interest loan is defined as "a loan that carries a current
interest rate that is two .. percentage points or more below the current yield on United
States Treasury securities with a comparable maturity." Id.
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loan from Habitat for Humanity into a 13.25% mortgage. 14 9 Household
paid all of Cook's expenses dealing with the debacle but only after they
received substantial pressure and bad publicity. In fact, Household did
this so frequently that "a sizable bloc of shareholders, in London[,
Kentucky,] for their annual meeting, supported the implementation of
safeguards against unfair lending practices."
1 5 0
Prohibiting the consolidation of low-interest loans is an important
addition to consumer-protection law. By padding the high-cost home
loan with no- or low-interest loans, the loan broker increases the amount
financed, which in turn increases his or her commission from arranging
the loan. The statute, however, assumes either 1) that the borrower is
able to make his payment to the benevolent lender of the no- or low-
interest loan when he consolidates that loan with the high-cost loan or
2) that the benevolent lender has mechanisms in place to deal with
defaulting borrowers. If these assumptions prove untrue, then the
paternalism of the law may lead a borrower unnecessarily to default or to
declare bankruptcy.
The downside of the Kentucky restriction appears when a borrower
cannot make his payments to the benevolent lender. The statute does not
allow the lender to incorporate the low-interest loan into a new loan,
even if the lender does not charge extra interest on the low-interest
loan. 51 In this way the statute, perhaps unintentionally, deprives the
borrower of the opportunity to turn to private lenders, who could offer a
loan with lower monthly payments over a longer period of time, when
the borrower cannot meet her no- or low-interest obligations. The statute
may better effectuate its purpose by stating that a lender of a high-cost
loan may not consolidate a no- or low-interest loan unless the buyer
provides proof from the benevolent lender that it has no mechanisms in
place to deal with default and proof that the borrower is unable to meet
the obligations under the no- or low-cost loan.
D. Single-Premium Insurance
K.R.S. § 360.100 prohibits a lender from financing "single premium
credit life, credit accident, credit health, credit disability, or credit loss of
income insurance in connection with a high-cost home loan."' 52 This
149 Laura Yeun, Reparations Mask Widespread Lender Problems, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, June 8, 2002, at C6, available at http://www.predatorylending.org/
newsheadlines/lexingtonkyherldr060802.cfm.
150 Id.
151 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(m).
1-2 § 360.100(2)(n).
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subsection is meant to protect vulnerable borrowers from expensive
insurance, which has been extremely profitable to the financial industry
and has padded loan brokers' commissions, all at the borrower's
expense. Some consumer advocates believe that the proscription of such
credit insurance "would save 500,000 families $2.1 billion each year"
because the payment for the insurance is added to the amount financed
and because the borrower pays the interest on the augmented amount
financed.153 Ultimately, it may take up to five years before any equity in
the home is purchased. 154 Besides the financial disincentive of single-
premium insurance for borrowers, such insurance has often been linked
to fraudulent practices because many lenders do not disclose the fact that
they have added insurance premiums into the loan amount. 155 Thus, with
the financial disincentives and fraudulent practices that surround such
insurance products, it is reasonable for the legislature to ban the sale of
such products completely.
It bears noting that multiple-premium credit insurance is not
implicated by K.R.S. § 360.100.156 The exclusion for multiple-premium
policies is beneficial for both borrowers and lenders. Monthly insurance
premiums are much more advantageous for the consumer because the
consumer can cancel the policy at will and because the policies are
usually much cheaper than single-premium policies. The Center for
Economic Justice compared the cost of financed, single-premium
insurance to a monthly premium insurance product using standard
insurance rates on a hypothetical $30,000 loan with a ten-year term and
a 15% interest rate. Over the lifetime of the loan, while the borrower paid
$6,515 for single-premium insurance and associated finance charges, she
paid only $1,747 for the monthly-premium insurance.' 57 Lenders also
benefit from multiple-premium insurance because it protects the credit
extended and remains very profitable.
Unfortunately, the legislature did not prohibit credit property
insurance, which is one of the most lucrative types of credit insurance for
lenders. Credit property insurance is insurance on the property that acts
as collateral for the loan.158 This type of insurance commands
exceptionally high commissions for loan brokers from the insurance
company because it can have a loss ratio as small as 7% (in other words,
1,
153 ERIC STEIN, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING 7 (2001), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/
Quantl001 .pdf#xml=http://predatorylending.org.master.com/texis/master/search/mysite.
xt?q=would+save+500%2C000+families+&order-r&id=38084219709070a7&cmd=xml.
114 See id. at 5-6.
155 Id. at 6-7.
156 See K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(n).
157 MODEL HOME LOAN PROTECTION ACT, supra note 14, § 3 cmt. (a).
' KEEST & RENUART, supra note 108, at 292-93.
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only $7 of every $100 is ever paid out) and thus a huge profit ratio of93% 159 Consumer advocates should recognize that borrowers, therefore,
are not completely protected from overly expensive, and potentially
fraudulent, credit insurance.
E. Videos/DVDs
K.R.S. § 360.100 requires that lenders of high-cost home loans make
"available to the borrower a videotape, or other similar audio-video
format.. ., approved by the Department of Financial Institutions, which
explains the borrower's rights and responsibilities with regard to . . .
high-cost home loans;" there must be "at least one.., copy of the video
in the principal office and each branch office of the tender."'160 This well
intentioned, but unclearly written, subsection appears to be a legislative
compromise between requiring involved credit counseling and merely
providing often-overlooked disclosures. The statute requires that the
lender make the video "available" to the borrower, 61 but there is no
guidance as to what "available" means. Does it mean that the lender is
required merely to have the video on the premises; that the lender must
notify the borrower of the existence of the video; or that the lender must
have a place and mode available for the borrower to view the video?
Even if lenders are not required to have a viewing area for
borrowers, they would be wise to make one available. The statute states
that "[a] lender shall have available for viewing at least one ... copy of
the video." 62 Thus, if the broker lends the video to a potential borrower
to view the video at home, the statute may be construed to require that
the lender have another copy at the office. Likewise, if the lender has
multiple borrowers needing to view the medium, it would need to have
several copies in the office. The existence of an in-office viewing area
would reduce not only the lender's confusion regarding to whom the
copies of the video are lent and the number of copies required, but also
the potential expense of buying multiple copies.
Another problem concerns the audio-visual medium chosen by the
lender. What happens if the lender, who does not have a viewing area,
has a DVD (one of the suggested media in the statute) for viewing, but
the borrower does not have access to a DVD player? In this way, lenders
could intentionally make it difficult for borrowers by selecting a media
format that requires an advanced technological device that most of the
clientele for high-cost home loans may not be able to afford. The lender,
59 Id. at 293.
160 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(o).
161 Id.
162 id.
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therefore, could make available only the audio-visual medium, not the
important information it contains. While lenders may argue that the
statute requires that they make only the medium available, such a narrow
reading would flout the intention of the legislature. Because the statute is
designed to inform and protect borrowers, courts should require that
lenders not only notify borrowers of the existence of the medium but also
verify that borrowers have access to the information contained in the
audio-visual medium.
F. Arbitration Clauses
K.R.S. § 360.100 prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses that are
"oppressive, unfair, unconscionable, or substantially in derogation of the
rights of consumers.' 63 Arbitration clauses that comply with the
"Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Dispute [sic]
Advisory Committee of the American Arbitration Association in effect
on June 24, 2003" are presumed not to violate the Kentucky statute.164
Kentucky has long favored arbitration,1 65 but, given the widespread use
of one-sided clauses, the legislature should reevaluate its choice.
Arbitration clauses have become increasingly complex and have
become more likely to favor lenders, who view these clauses as
mechanisms for avoiding expensive litigation. For instance, these clauses
most often prohibit certain remedies, class actions, and arbitrators not
selected by the lender. 166 Because these clauses tend to favor the lender,
the Model Home Loan Protection Act proscribes all mandatory
arbitration clauses.1 67 But consumer advocates should be forewarned that
the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act broadly. 168 The Court's interpretation allows the Act to
preempt certain state laws concerning arbitration, especially those that
disfavor it, leaving state legislatures without much room to attack
arbitration clauses. 169 If a lender later pressures a borrower to enter
163 § 360.100(2)(p).
164 Id. The Statement of Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee is available at http:// http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019#STATEMENT
OFPRINCIPLES.
165 See Fayette County Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Martin, 758 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. Ct. App.
1988) (interpreting a Kentucky statute regarding arbitration as espousing "the policy that
arbitration is to be encouraged").
166 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 4 cmt. (g).
167 Id. § 4(g).
168 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2004); see Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), cited in Pacificare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401,
407 n.2 (2003) (stating explicitly, in a unanimous opinion (except for Justice Thomas,
who did not participate in the case), that there is a presumption in favor of arbitration).
169 See RENUART, supra note 15, at 186.
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arbitration, consumer advocates can argue that the arbitration clause at
issue in their case is unconscionable under state law 170 and therefore
should not be enforced.17
1
G. Late Payment Fees
While K.R.S. § 360.100 has several subsections that seek to prevent
foreclosure upon default, most defaults do not result in foreclosure.
Instead, the borrower often remedies the default and compensates the
lender for the late payment with a late payment fee. 172 Because lenders
often prefer late payment fees to foreclosure, they may abuse the use of
penalties as a way to generate additional income. K.R.S. § 360.100
disallows any late payment fees unless the fee is 1) limited to the greater
of either ten dollars or 5% of the amount past due; 2) assessed only once
on any single late payment; and 3) assessed only for a payment that is
past due by fifteen days or more. t7 3 This necessary provision prevents
lenders from using late payment fees as a way to increase revenue to the
point that borrowers are unable to make their payments. For instance, if a
5% fee could be charged on a fifteen-day late payment of $1,000, under
the terms of K.R.S. § 360.100, the highest amount owed would be
$1,050.174 Without this statute, however, the lender could charge at least
another 5% on the amount owed within another few days, bringing the
total to at least $1,102.50. If a borrower is temporarily out of work or on
a strict budget when an emergency arises, a payment that increases by
$100 or more could ultimately result in foreclosure.
Consumer advocates should also be aware of another questionable
practice whereby lenders hold payments in their offices and post them
late to collect late payment fees. Unlike the Model Home Loan
Protection Act, which requires lenders to treat each payment as posted to
their accounts on the day the payment is received,175 Kentucky has no
such requirement. Thus, dishonest lenders are still able to charge late
fees even when the borrower made a timely payment. To combat this
potential abuse, Kentucky should follow the lead of the Model Home
170 This is a ground that the Court has not explicitly found preempted by federal law.
Cf Onvoy -. Shal, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003) (created a rule regarding
arbitration clauses that left "room for consumers to escape obvious abuses of power in
contracting").
171 SeeRENAURT, supra note 15, at 190.
172 See id. at 26.
173 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(q) (Michie 2004).
174 This result is obtained because fifty dollars, as 5% of the total amount owed,
would be the highest attainable fee and because the lender could only charge the fee once.
See id.175 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 3(d)(5).
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Loan Protection Act by requiring lenders to post payment on the date
payment is received.
H. Payoff-Request Charges
Borrowers may ask the lender to provide a detailed amortization of
the loan, including the amount of money left to be paid, the interest
assessed, etc. K.R.S. § 360.100 allows lenders to charge the greater of
ten dollars or "actual costs" for each of the borrower's first two requests
for a written payoff calculation in a calendar year.176 Because of the "or"
in the statute's language, the lender cannot charge both a ten dollar fee
and the actual cost. Thus, ten dollars will usually be the highest charge
for any written payoff calculation request, except in the rare instances
where the actual cost exceeds ten dollars (which would be unusual
because the lender merely prints out information already contained in a
computer). By allowing the borrower to have access to his account
information for a reasonable fee, the statute encourages borrowers to
communicate with the lender about the effect of finance charges on their
loan. But after the first two requests in any calendar year, this statute sets
no limitation on the amount a lender may charge for the calculation.
This limitation appears reasonable to prevent borrowers from harassing
lenders for multiple payout calculations that do not change significantly
from one six-month period to another.
. Encouraging Default
In the past, dishonest lenders have encouraged potential borrowers to
default on a loan that the lender hopes to refinance. By defaulting, the
borrower may be subjected to immense pressure to accept the terms of a
potentially unnecessary and more costly refinancing in order to escape
foreclosure under the original obligation under default. North Carolina,
the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Virginia all have provisions
prohibiting lenders from encouraging default.177 Kentucky, following
these other jurisdictions' leads, bars lenders from encouraging or
recommending "default on an existing loan ... in connection with the
closing of a high-cost home loan that refinances all or a portion of the
existing loan or debt." 178 Consumer advocates should ask their clients
whether the lender encouraged defaulting on loans to be refinanced. Such
evidence could demonstrate a violation of both Kentucky's statute and
176 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(r).
177 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 3 cmt. (c).
17 K.R.S. § 360.100(2)(t).
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the common law, as the lender potentially obtained the loan through
duress.
IV. CAUSES OF ACTION AND LIABILITY
A. Causes ofAction
K.R.S. § 360.100(3) allows a cause of action by the Attorney
General, the commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions,
and parties to the high-cost home loan for any violations of the
provisions in subsection (2).179 Any violation of 360.100(2) is deemed
usurious and unlawful.' 80 Further, such violations constitute "an unfair
and deceptive act or practice" in violation of the KCPA.18" ' K.R.S.
§ 360.100(3) also applies to anyone who in bad faith: 1) structures a
high-cost home loan as an open-end credit transaction;' 82 2) divides any
loan into parts to avoid the provisions of this statute; or 3) engages "in
any other such subterfuge."'' 83 These catch-all provisions allow
borrowers to maintain a cause of action even when the lender arranges
the terms of the loan in order to escape the literal terms of the statute.
Peculiarly, subsection (3) begins by excluding causes of action based
on interest-rate increases, not due to default, on variable-rate loans. 84
Why subsection (3) reiterates this exception, already created in
subsection (2)(e), but not the myriad other exceptions created throughout
the statute is unclear. Possibly, the reference to "paragraph (e) of
subsection (2) of this section" was meant to refer to previously deleted
material contained in that section or to subsection (4), which creates
defenses to causes of action.
185
At least with the first few cases brought under K.R.S. § 360.100, the
parties are likely to argue over whether a private cause of action is even
allowed under the statute. Because the statute states that a violation is
"an unfair and deceptive act or practice . . . in violation of the
provisions" of the KCPA, a question arises whether the plaintiff-
borrower must meet the KCPA's requirements to have a private right of
action.186
"9 § 360.100(3)(c).
"0 § 360.100(3).
181 Id. (citing the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, codified at K.R.S. § 367.170);
see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
182 As of October 1, 2001, a lender who structures a high-cost home loan as an
open-end credit transaction also violates HOEPA. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(b) (2004).
' K.R.S. § 360.100(3).
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 id.
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Under the KCPA, plaintiff-borrowers bringing a private action must
purchase "goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes and thereby suffer[] any ascertainable loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by
another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by K.R.S.
§ 367.170. '' 187 Since the high-cost home loan must concem a home,
these requirements are substantially similar to those required to maintain
a cause of action under K.R.S. § 360.100.188 In most cases, there will be
an ascertainable loss of money or property resulting from another's
deceptive practice since the predatory lending tactic causes the borrower
to pay more interest or other fees than under a non-predatory subprime
loan.
However, it is unclear whether a cause of action exists when there is
no clearly ascertainable loss and when plaintiff is not seeking actual
damages. In this case, a lender could argue that the plaintiff-borrower
has failed to meet all of the requirements established by the KCPA. 89 On
the other hand, the plaintiff-borrower could argue that he or she does not
have to meet the criteria for the KCPA because K.R.S. § 360.100(3)
explicitly states that any violation of subsection (2) is an automatic
violation of the KCPA; it does not require that plaintiffs meet any further
requirements for a cause of action under the KCPA.' 90 The plaintiff,
then, would have a cause of action under both K.R.S. § 360.100 and the
KCPA.
B. Loophole: Good-Faith Provisions
While upon first reading the legislature appears to apply a strict
liability standard to any violation of subsection (2), the statute allows
lenders to escape liability through two large loopholes. The first is the
"30-day rule," which allows lenders to correct any violation within thirty
days of the loan's closing, as long as the lender made the mistake (any
kind of mistake) in good faith.191 The second loophole allows the lender
sixty days from the date of the discovery of noncompliance to correct
only "bona fide" mistakes. 192 Examples of bona fide mistakes include
unintentional ones like "clerical, calculation, computer malfunction,
computer programming, and printing errors.', 193 Besides the requirement
187 § 367.220(1).
188 See § 360.100(1)(a)(3).
89 See § 367.220(1).
190 § 360.100(3).
'9' § 360.100(4)(a).
192 § 360.100(4)(b).
193id.
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that the error be bona fide, the lender will escape liability under this
loophole only if it has adopted reasonable procedures to avoid bona fide
mistakes.1 94 Thus, the type of mistake that the lender makes is inapposite
if made with good faith and caught within 30 days; the type of mistake
must meet the stricter definition of "bona fide" if the lender catches it
between 30 and 60 days later. To benefit from both of these loopholes,
lenders would be wise to set up systems designed to catch and correct
any errors within thirty days.
If a lender does fall within either statutory exception, it must make
"appropriate restitution,"' 95 which the statute defines as "reimbursement
by the lender of any points, fees, interest, or other charges made by the
lender and received from the borrower necessary to put the borrower in
the same position as he or she would have been had the loan, as adjusted
in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, been
originally made."' 96 In addition to making restitution, the lender must
also make the loan comply with K.R.S. § 360.100(2) or, at the election of
the "[b]orrower, change the terms of the loan ... so that the loan will no
longer be considered a high-cost home loan."' 97 Both parties should
notice the importance of the statutory mandate requiring the lender to
change the terms of the loan: since subsection (3) tells lenders that they
cannot engage in subterfuge to disguise the high-cost home loan, lenders
cannot make a mere cosmetic change to the loan. Instead, if the borrower
requests that the loan no longer be a high-cost home loan, the lender
must change not only the terms that violated K.R.S. § 360.100 but also
other substantive terms of the loan, like the interest rate, to render the
loan a non-high-cost home loan. Such compulsory alteration greatly
reduces the profitability of the loan and provides an appropriate incentive
for lenders to put safeguards in place to prevent statutory violations.'
98
C. Statute of Limitations and Liability
Because K.R.S. § 360.100 does not provide a statute of limitations, it
is unclear what the period of limitation is.)99 Most likely, the KCPA's
limitation period is applicable, since K.R.S. § 360.100, when discussing
'94 See id.
195 § 360.100(4).
196 § 360.100(4)(c).
19' § 360.100(4)(a) & (b).
.9 Contrary to K.R.S. § 360.100, the Model Home Loan Protection Act only allows
lenders (and assignees, who have liability under the Act) to remedy violations if the
lender itself discovers the violation. See MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14,
§ 7(c). Such a requirement even more strongly encourages lenders to design safeguards to
uncover potential violations than Kentucky's exceptions.
'
99 See K.R.S. § 360.100.
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causes of action, expressly references the KCPA.200 The KCPA requires
a plaintiff to file an action within two years of a violation or within one
year after the termination of an action brought by the Attorney
General. 201
Oddly, K.R.S. § 360.100(3) states that "[a]ny person seeking
damages or penalties under the provisions of this section may recover
damages under either this chapter or K.R.S. Chapter 367, but not
both., 20 2 Since damages are not mentioned under K.R.S. § 360.100, it is
unclear why a borrower would seek remedies under this statute, rather
than simply using it to establish statutory violations to collect damages
under the KCPA. By suggesting that one may recover under K.R.S.
§ 360.100, the legislature may have meant that courts are free to award
any equitable or otherwise appropriate remedy.a 3 Although the KCPA
provides injunctive relief,2°4 attorney's fees, 20 actual damages, and
,,206 ltrpunitive damages "where appropriate, the legislature should provide
damages directly under K.R.S. § 360.100 to avoid any confusion.
The Model Home Loan Protection Act provides for recovery of
costs, attorney's fees, actual damages, statutory damages, and equitable
relief.207 Attorney's fees are especially important because they allow
practicing attorneys to act as "private attorney generals" when
representing clients who often do not have the resources to pay court
costs and fees. Moreover, statutory damages, which under the Model
Home Loan Protection Act are "equal to the finance charges.., plus ten
percent ... of the amount financed," 28 create a compelling enforcement
mechanism that compels lenders to respect the predatory lending law,
without requiring borrowers to prove an elevated scienter for damages
that are essentially punitive.
200 See § 360.100(3).
201 § 367.220(5).
202 § 360.100(3)(c).
203 Cf Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (stating that the federal courts may
use any available remedy when the statute, which does not expressly address remedies,
provides a general right to sue for violation of statutory rights), cited in Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (finding that courts may fashion appropriate remedies
for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982).2 4 See K.R.S. § 367.220(4).
20 § 367.220(3).
206 § 367.220(1). In Gooch v. DuPont Co., 40 F. Supp. 2d 857 (W.D. Ky. 1998), the
court stated that Kentucky requires gross negligence for an award of punitive damages.
Id. at 862.
207 MODEL HOME LOAN PROT. ACT, supra note 14, § 7(a).
2 8 See id. § 7(a)(2)(B).
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V. CONCLUSION
Financial institutions are already reacting to K.R.S. § 360.100.
Standard and Poor's issued a memo to the public stating that, after
reviewing Kentucky's new law, it will require lenders who issue loans in
Kentucky to demonstrate two things: that the loan at issue is not a high-
cost home loan and that there are procedures in place to prevent a loan
from being a high-cost home loan.2 9 If the issuer admits that the loan is
a high-cost home loan, Standard and Poor's requires that the issuer
review each note to be sure that it does not violate Kentucky's new law.
The firm does, however, comfort assignees by mentioning that liability
hinges on whether the violation is apparent on the face of the promissory
note or disclosure.210 Such a lengthy evaluation of Kentucky's new law
demonstrates that the financial community expects its members to
prevent violations of the statute. Nonetheless, it also reveals that without
sufficient assignee liability, assignees will not place the statute on equal
footing with federal legislation, such as TILA.
Although the market has taken notice of Kentucky's new law,
advocates must be conscious of which borrowers lenders will likely
target. For example, residents of predominantly black neighborhoods are
five times more likely to have subprime loans than are residents of
predominantly white neighborhoods.2 ' Similarly, residents of low
income neighborhoods are three times more likely to be plagued by
subprime lending than residents of high-income neighborhoods.1 2 Yet,
predatory lenders' main target is the elderly, who are "cash-poor" but
"asset-rich., 213 The elderly often have substantial equity in their homes,
but rarely have additional money for home improvements or
emergencies. When they must cash out some of the equity in their
homes, their limited finances or lack of basic financial knowledge often
214leads them to predatory lenders. Lawyers have a moral duty to take
inventory of their clients, determine which ones may be at risk, and warn
them of predatory lending practices. By keeping those at risk informed,
lawyers can prevent many clients from turning to predatory lenders and
209 See Standard & Poor's, supra note 61.
210 See id.
211 ROBERT G. QUERCIA ET AL., CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITALISM AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA'S
ANTI--PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DEscRIPTIvE ASSESSMENT 4 (2003), at
http://www.responsiblelending.org.pdfs.PredLendingStudy.pdf.
212 Id.
213 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE CASE FOR PREDATORY LENDING REFORM
2 (2002), at http://www.predatorylending.org/pdfs/pp-caseFor-PLReform- I002.pdf.
214 id.
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can also recommend credit counselors who may be able to suggest
solutions for their clients' financial problems.
If a client 'believes he or she has been the victim of predatory
lending, but documentary evidence reveals no violations, advocates also
have an obligation to ask clients whether the lender made representations
not reflected in the documents. Forged documents are common in
predatory lending. 2'5 As a former employee of a predatory lender
testified at a Senate hearing, "The pressure to produce loan volume and
insurance sales is so great that on many occasions, I've seen finance
company employees commit forgery on a massive scale. These
employees have forged everything from insurance forms. .. [to] income
verification forms, and even entire loan files." 21 6 Kentucky's predatory
lending law is not a panacea to all home-lending problems; it is merely a
useful tool to protect the financial dignity of borrowers and allow them to
recover from unscrupulous lenders.
With some minor adjustments and liberal judicial construction,
K.R.S. § 360.100 could become a potent weapon against predatory
lending. Although some lenders may argue that this legislation will have
a negative impact upon the availability of credit for those with few assets
or poor credit histories, the Center for Community Capitalism found that
the North Carolina predatory lending law has "not [kept] people from
becoming homeowners by constraining the flow of subprime credit.,
217
In fact, it concluded that the North Carolina law "is doing what it is
supposed to do., 218 North Carolina has also found that its law, even if it
has not limited the number of predatory lending complaints filed, has
changed the ability of advocates to "achieve settlements in cases where
predatory lending is alleged., 21 9 With diligent consumer advocates and
responsible lenders, Kentucky's statute has the chance to be equally as
successful, benefiting both borrowers and honest lenders.
215 Id. at 5.
216 Id. (citation omitted).
217 QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 211, at 15.
21 1 Id. at22.
219 Smith, supra note 5.
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